Because views on relational database systems mathematically define arbitrary sets of stored and derived data, they have been proposed as a way of handling context-and contenbdependent classification, dynamic classification, inference, aggregation, and sanitization in multilevel database systems. This paper describes basic view concepts for a multilevelsecure relational database model that addresses the above issues. The model treats stored and derived data uniformly within the database schema. All data in the database is classified according to views called classification constraints, which specify security levels for related data. In addition, views called aggregation constraints specifies classifications for aggregates that are classified higher than the constituent elements. All data accesses are confined to a third set of views called access views, which higher than their declared
secure views.
Basic Concepts
Our preliminary model has several key aspects. First, we explicitly allow the specification of derived data in a database schema so that the relationships between stored and derived data (which can cause inferences) can be formally expressed. Next, we distinguish between views that classify the data and views that retrieve or update data. AU data in the database is classified down to the element level according to a set of views called clamijication con8trairzt8. Classification constraints specify security levels and relationships among stored and derived data, thereby providing a means of handling context and content dependencies, inferences, and sanitization. In addition, a set of views called aggregation corz8t raint8 specify classifications for aggregates having a higher security level than their constituent elements. All data accesses are confined to acce8s view8, which filter out all data classified higher than the declared view level. Access views allow a user to retrieve data at his level from a relation that also has higher-level data without the need to retrieve from a higher-level container -our model has no containers. Data retrieved }hrough an access view can be joined and manipulated to form a premntation view, which is the view displayed to the user.
Because our objective is a class Al system, it is imperative that our formal model of the reference monitor be tractable. We plan to achieve this objective by layering our design and placing only the essential security features in the lowest layers that comprise the reference monitor. Most of the database system, including the query processor, will reside above the reference monitor layer. A consequence of this approach is that certain features in our policy model -e.g., for content-dependent classification and sanitization -will rely on trusted processes that reside in layers above the reference monitor. Our preliminary design, outlined in Section 6, is based on a reference mcmitor that protects objects at the eiement level of a relation and builds on existing technology for security kernels and trusted computing bases (TCBS).
Because we are in the fiit year of a three-year effort, our policy model and design are somewhat tentative and incomplete; there remain several open problems and many details to be resolved. The concepts described in this paper represent an initial step in our research.
Security Levels, Classiflcatlons,
and Clearance Fundamental to any multilevel security policy are security levels, classifications, and clearances. A uecurity level is an element of a lattice structure having a partial ordering relation '~' (e.g., see Dennings). For levels U and L2, L1~L2 means that level L1 dominate8 level L2. (If L1 > L2, we say L1 utrictl~dominateu L2.) Note that what we call 'security level' is identical to what some other authors have called 'access class'. Some authors prefer 'access class' to (1) avoid the (incorrect) implication that 'level' applies only to total orderings and (2) avoid confusion with the term 'multilevel' in DoD Directive 5200.28, which refers specifically to just the totally ordered classifications CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, etc.
All data in the database is assigned a cla88ijicat ion of some security level. In addition, each user has an associated security level, called a clearance. To access data in the database, the user's clearance must dominate the classification of the data.
Our model leaves unspecified the exact representation and interpretation of security level. For a given system, the level may consist of a secrecy component, an integrity component, or both (as in the I.P. Sharp modelll). The secrecy component could be a sensitivity level, category, or pair <sensitivity level, category >, where 8en8it ivity level is TOP-SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, UNCLASSIFIED, etc. and category is a set consisting of formal compartments (e.g., CRYPTO). Similarly, the integrity component could be an integrity level, integrity category, or pair <integrity level, integrity category > such as introduced by Biba12. The lattice on the security levels is defined as the Cartesian product of lattices on the individual components. Note that when integrity is integrated with secrecy, integrity levels are ordered in reverse so that L1 > L2 means that L1 has a higher secrecy component but lower integrity component. This is because a user is permitted to read down in secrecy but up in integrity, and write up in secrecy but down in integrity.
Multiievei Reiations
We shall develop our concept of secure data views in terms of the relational data model. The relational data model consists of relat ion8 (also called tables) together with a relational algebra for defining new relations in terms of other relations (the relational model also includes entity and referential integrity rules that govern the existence of certain record% these are not relevant to the concepts discussed here). Each relation R is defined by a 8chema R (A1, A2, The set of schemas defining the relations in the database is itself represented as a relation: RELATIONS(RELNAME, ATTRNAME), which contains an entry for each attribute of each relation (sometimes two relations are used, one for the relation names and the other for the attributes). For example, the entry (viz,, tuple) <FLIGHT, WEIGHT> specifies that the FLIGHT relation contains the attribute WEIGHT. The RELATIONS relation may include other attributes -e.g., for specifying domain type.
To deal with multilevel security, we first make the individual elements of a relation the primitive objects of classification and protection. Each element is characterized by <rolstion, sttributo, tuplo, Tsluo, 10TO1>
-that is, the elements of the relation may have different security Ieveia.
Note that security levels are associated with primitive contexts of the form (relation, record, attribute, value) rather than just the stored values. This is because a value such as '17.3' is not classified in isolation (e.g., as it appears in this paragraph); it becomes classified by its association with a particular relation, attribute, or tuple.
Although each element has a security level, we do not require that classification be at the element level or that security labels be stored with each data element. In practice, data can often be classified at the attribute, record, or even relation level. Our approach allows this by permitting the level of an element to be defiied in terms of higher-level structures.
When a level is defined for an entire attribute (or record), that level applies to each data element associated with the attribute (or record) rather than the aggregate structure. Aggregation is handled by other means, which we shaii describe later. Moreover, defining a level for an attribute does not necessarily imply that the name of the attribute need be at that level; the classification associated with the attribute name ia determined by the classification of the attribute's entry in the RELATIONS relation. Thus, the name of an attribute can be classified lower than the values associated with the attribute in order to allow a user to see the relation schema but not its data (e.g., in order to insert tuples into the relation).
In later sections, we shall illustrate how security levels can be associated with our Flight database. We shall assume that all security levels are 4-tuplea <sensitivity level, category, integrity level, integrity category >, but make the simplifying assumption in the illustrations that all but the sensitivity level are fried; thus each security level will be specified simply as TOP-SECRET, SECRET, etc. By holding the integrity component r~d, our examples wiii be free of possible integrity violations (our model, however, handles integrity through the security levels).
where the component level gives the classification of the element. For element z, we will write x.leuei to denote that component. A relation can be multilevel
Databaae
As in the relational model, a database is a finite set of named relations. The data in a relation can be represented either physically asstored data or logically as a derivation rule that defines how the data is computed (derivation rules, which are arbitrary formulas in the query language, are described later). Whether data are stored or derived is not relevant to our model. Any given relation may have both stored and derived data.
The reason for modeling derived data is that it allows interdependencies and inference rules among stored and derived data to be expressed within a single framework. For example, consider the attribute WEIGHT from the ITEM relation and the attributes QTY and WEIGHT from the PAYLOAD relation. Suppose that PAYLOAD.WEIGHT is derived data, defined in terms of the join of the two relations as follows (using a SQL-like notation where ':=' means assignment and '=' means comparison): As another example, suppose that a sum is taken over all records in a relation, where the individual eleinents used to compute the sum are all SECRET, and that it is desired to release the sum at a lower level, say CONFIDENTIAL, on the grounds that it sufficiently sanitizes the individual elements. Here again, the decision whether the sum can be marked down depends only on the inferences that can be drawn from it, and not on whether it is actually stored in the database.
It is not necessary or indeed practical to
represent all conceivable derivations in the database schema -that is, the database need not represent the inferential closure. Aa in the relational model, a user can compute his own views of the data represented in the database using the query language (see Section 4.2).
VSewa
A view is a mapping (multi-valued function) from a database (set of relations) to a relation (or set thereof). For security, we are particularly concerned about the subset of data in the database that is used to compute the resulting relation. We shall call this subset of elements the view 8ource. In general, the source will consist of those data elements whose attributes are named (explicitly or implicitly) in the view mapping and whose tuples are selected by conditions in the mapping. The elements in the source may be joined and manipulated (e.g., by numerical operators) to compute the result. We call this result the view target. With the exception of presentation views that manipulate and display retrieved data, we require that a view target correspond to a complete or partial relation (or set thereof) in the database -that is, that the attributes and tuples in the result correspond to (stored or derived) attributes and tuples in the database (the correspondence need not necessarily be l-l). The target of a view can overlap with its source.
For a view V, we will express the derivation 8ource -+ target in a SQL-like query language that includes the relational and arithmetic operators. We can express our definition of PAYLOAD .WEIGHT as view as follows: The term 'view' is often used to refer to the actual data returned when a view specification is applied to an instance of the database. Here, we shall reserve the term 'view' for the specification or mapping function, and use 'view instance' or simply 'data' to refer to the data bound to a view at view application time.
Every view V has an associated classification, which we denote by Vhvef. In general, the security level of a view refers to the level of the data associated with the view, but the exact interpretation of view level depends on the type of view.
We shall use views for two distinct purposes: classification and access. First we shall describe views for classifying the data that do not explicitly take into account aggregation problems. Next we shall describe views for accessing the data. Then we shall return to the aggregation problem.
Views for Classifying Data
All data in the database is classified according to a set of views called classification constraints. Two special types of classification constraints, derivation rules and sanitization rules, serve to state classification requirements for derived data. Inference problems arising from relationships among the data are avoided by ensuring that the set of all classification constraints is consistent.
operators ' @ ' (for least upper bound) and ' @ ' (greatest lower bound).
The set of all classification constraints is denoted by CC. For a view V E CC, the classification requirement is formaUy expressed by the following axiom, which states that for all database instances, each element in the target must be classified with the level of the constraint (the notation V.8ource and V.target refer to the source and target instances of V respectively):
Classification Axiom y.level = Klevel , V y~V3arget
This axiom, as well as all othera that we shall define, states an invariant amertion about the state of the database. Security requires that all of these =ioms be satisfied for all database instances. Later, we will discuss how we might design a system that enforces security.
The following is a classification constraint on the Flight database specifying that all data associated with the attribute WEIGHT of relation PAYLOAD is to be classified TOP-SECRET (i.e., classflcation is at the attribute level as in the Hinke-Schaefer18 design). The above is actually a set of constraints, one for each binding of the parameter x to a flight number. The level of each view is specified as an expression that effectively assigns the level associated with the flight to all fields of all payload records for that flight. We cannot express the classification of PAYLOAD as a single constraint because the target elements of a constraint must be classified uniformly.
A classification constraint is called a 8tat ic clas8i/ication constraint if its level is specified as a constant; otherwise it is called a derived clawij icat ion constraint.
We shall now discuss two special types of classification constraints, derivation rules and sanitization rules. Both are usually specified as derived constraints.
Derlvatlon Rules
A derivation rule is a view specifying how derived data is computed. Because derived data generally reveals information about the source data, each derivation rule is also interpreted as a classification constraint on the data, where the level associated with the view must be the least upper bound of the levels of aU data in the source (derivations that sanitize their source are described in the next subsection). 
&4. Consistency and Completeness
The set CC of all classification constraints (including derivation and sanitization rules) must be complete and consistent for every instance of the database. Completene88 means that each element in the database is assigned a security level. Conaid ency means that there exists an assignment of levels to the data that simultaneously satisfies all classification constraints -specifically the class~lcation, derivation, and sanitization axioms. Returning to our flights database, the situation is somewhat more complicated because the join attribute ITEM# is used to derive PAYLOAD.WEIGHT. If ITEM# is classified higher than ITEM.WEIGHT and PAYLOAD.QTY, then PAYLOAD.WEIGHT will be forced to the higher level. This could be avoided by expressing the derivation as the foUowing sanitization rule (and demonstrating that ITEM# cannot be inferred from PAYLOAD.WEIGHT): 
PAYKIAD. OIY.1OFO1}
We will now sketch an algorithm for assigning classification levels to the data in a database instance and determining whether the constraints are complete and consistent. The algorithm uses a cla88i~icat ion graph, which is a bipartite directed graph consisting of two types of nodes: classification constraints and database elements. Each classification constraint (including derivation and sanitization rule) and element is represented in the graph. All edges in the graph connect a classification constraint V and a database element z according to the foUowing two rules:
The initial constraint nodes of the graph (%nodes without incoming edges) correspond to the static classification constraints -that is, those constraints with fixed (constant) levels. The set of constraints is complete if every element node (z-node) can be reached by a directed path from an initial constraint node.
To assign levels to the data elements, we traverse the graph as follows. We begin by 'firing' each initial constraint node -i.e., passing its level to each immediate successor (element node) along its outgoing edges. A data element is ready to be assigned a level and fire if at least one of its incoming edges delivers such a level. The element node fires by passing its level down its outgoing edges. If two or more different incoming edges ever attempt to deliver conflicting levels to the same data element node, an inconsistency occurs and is reported; in this case, the algorithm terminates unsucce&fully.
New constraints are fried when all of their immediate predecessor nodes have been aasigned levels. The effect of firing a constraint node is to evaluate its level from the element levels delivered its incoming edges, associate that level with the constraint, and pass the level to each immediate successor. Of course, the effect of the new firings must be checked for inconsistencies.
In practice, one would like a set of classification constraints that are provably complete and consistent for all database instances -that is, where completeness and consistency can be determined by analyzing the constraints with respect to the database schema rather than any given instance. We are presently investigating properties that guarantee this and algorithms for processing such constraints.
Views for Accessing Data
Data in the database is accessed and presented to the user through access views, which control database retrieval and update, and presentation views, which govern the way data is displayed.
Access VIewm
All accesses to the database for retrieval, update, insert, and delete are controlled by a set AV of views called acce88 view8. An access view specifies some subset of the database (including derived data), but does not itself specify any computation (derivation). Computations on access views can be defiied through presentation views. In addition to a claas~lcation, an access view has an authorization list for discretionary security.
The security level associated with an access view does not define the class~lcation of the data ia the view, but rather is used to ensure that all data disclosed by the view is at or below the view level. Thus, a SECRET-level access view simply ensures that all data obtained through the view (directly or by inference) will never be higher than SECRET.
An access view thus acts as a fiiter on the database, hiding all data that is not dominated by the view level. This applies not only to the data in the target of the view, but also to all data in the view source. Aa previously noted, restricting the classification of the source data is essential in order to 14, 15, le. The filtering proec%S prevent user inferences is similar to query modification in INGRESB in that each access view is effectively modified to select only data dominated by the view level. Unlike INGRES, however, the rdtering will be implemented in a layer below the query processor (see Section 6) so that there need be no real trust in access views (specifically, in their correct interpretation). In practice, the filtering logically removes all data from the database that is not dominated by V.levef as follows:
For an access view
1. ff no value for an attribute is dominated by V.hwel, then the attribute is deleted.
If no value for an entire record is dominated by
VJeve/, then the record is deleted.
If, after removing attributea and records, an element remains that is not dominated by
VJeve/, the element is replaced by ml (meaning 'undefined') and assigned the security level UNCLASSIFIED. Even though the mandatory access axiom requires that the view level be identical to the user's login level for read-write updates, it does not prohibit a user from updating multilevel data through a single view. This is because the filtering axiom permits data visible through a view to be lower than the view level. As an example, using a TOP-SECRET access view, a TOP-SECRET user could simultaneously update a tuple containing both SECRET and TOP-SECRET attributes. Although permitting multilevel updates is highly desirable, it may introduce some risk. One way of controlling this risk is to limit the range over which a multilevel update can be performed (e.g., to two adjacent security levels); another is to require that all such updates originate from the user (rather than software).
Note that the replacement of classified data & nil values does not completely hide the data in that the

The third axiom states that U can perform an operation o on V only if o is spec~lcally authorized to u Discretionary Access Axiom
In addition to the above axioms, we require that all access views used for update, insert, and delete are welldefined -i.e., that the data in the target can be mapped back onto the source. In general, this requires that the target for each such view be stored (rather than derived) data and include a key for each relation named.
A consequence of our view approach is that an access view will never disclose data at a level higher than the view level (directly or indirectly by inference), even if the data in the database changes value or classification. This means that it is impossible for an access view to be accidentally underclassified, and access views never need be reclassified or revoked because of database updates (revocation is needed only if a user's clearance changes or the discretionary policy changes). To illustrate, consider the following SECRET access view, which retrieves the flight number and date of all flights: In general, a user may be able to insert or update records in a relation having attributes that are invisible to the user. For update, this is not a problem (as long as the update can be mapped back onto the source database), because the invisible attributes will have values. For insert, however, the effect of such an insert will be to create records with nil values for all invisible attributes. With respect to the classification process outlined earlier, each instantiation of the constraint ITEM-LEVEL is an initial constraint node (bound to a fixed security level at the time it is bound to a speci!lc item).
It is often desirable to insert data into
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Presentation
Views For many applications, usera want data presented graphically or statistically, or they want some complex calculation to be performed over the data. A presentation view is a view displayed or returned to a user, and is the result of composing an access view with numeric and statistical operators, and operators for formatting and display. Many of these operators (e.g., those used for formatting) will be invisible to the user and implicit in the retrieve command. Unlike all other views, the target of a presentation view is not considered to be part of the database.
In general, users are free to form arbitrary presentation views from access views for which they are authorized; there are no security requirements for presentation views other than that they retain the markings on all source data, and label all computed data with the level of the access view. A presentation view can be freely disseminated. Since it is specified in terms of an access view, it can be applied only by users who have authorization for the access view.
Aggregation
We now turn to the aggregation problem: classifying and protecting collections of data that have a higher security level than any of the elements that comprise the aggregate. First, we shall identify three important classes of aggregation and show how one of these classes can be handled through appropriate database structuring and classification of join attributes. Then we shall introduce another type of view constraint, called an aggregation constraint, for dealing with those cases that cannot be handled by structuring and simple classification. An aggregation constraint defines the security level of the aggregate and imposes additional restrictions on access views. These restrictions apply to individual users, but not to groups of users collectively.
Aggregation Claaaes and Database Structuring
The aggregation problem arises when data is brought together through associations to provide a larger context. Although one could in principle assign a higher security level to an arbitrary set of data, the cases of practical interest seem to fall into the following categories:
1. Attribute as80ciation8. These correspond to associations among the attributes of the schema and fall into two sub-categories:
a. A880ciation8 among attribute8 in dijjerent relations.
Here, it is the association between different types of entities (as represented by different relations) that is class~led higher. Examples are the association between the source and receiver of a transmission, and a flight and item (meaning the item is in the flight's payload).
b. A880ciation8 among attribute in a 8ingle relation.
Here, associations among some of the attributes of an entity are classified higher than the attributes taken separately. An example is an association between longitude and latitude for an object, which might be higher than either coordinate alone.
2. Size-based record a880ciation8. These correspond to associations among the records of a relation, where, for example, any collection of more than n records in the same relation is considered to have a security level higher than that associated with a single record. This case is illustrated by the familiar 'phone book' problem, where the entries in the phone book for a wellknown agency are at one level, but the entire phone book, or even a set of more than n entries from the book, is at a higher level.
It is usually possible to handle the first type of attribute association between entities of different types with appropriate database structuring and classification. We will assume that the entities are represented by different relations, and that the association is represented either by a separate relation that contains join attributes for both relations, or by join attributes that are stored in either or both of the entity relations. In general, these join attributes will be primary or secondary keys, but entities can be related by non-key attributes as well. Regardless of how the joins are represented, the association can be effectively marked at the higher level by classifying at least one of each pair of attributes used for joining the relations at the higher level. For the case where the association is represented entirely by a separate relation (i.e., no meaningful associations can be made by joining the relations for the separate entities), the entire relation may be classified up. If for some reason it does not make sense to classify the join attributes up, then aggregation constraints must be defined as described later.
To illustrate how an association can be classified up, suppose that all flights and items are classified SECRET, but that the association between flights and items is to be regarded as TOP-SECRET. Since this association is represented entirely by the PAYLOAD relation ( An aggregation constraint is similar to a classification constraint in that it defiies a security level for a target instance of the database; however, this security level is applied only to the entire aggregate, and not to the individual elements in the target. We also assume that the scope of each aggregation constraint is minimal. For attribute-based aggregation, this means that a minimal set of attributes is specified (i.e., any smaller set of attributes does not cause an aggregation problem). For size-based aggregation, a minimal number of records is specified. Note that aggregation constraints and sanitization rules serve dual roles: whereas aggregation raises the view level, sanitization lowers the classification of data derived from the view. Indeed, the aggregation problem might be handled by classifying each element in the aggregate at the higher level, and using a sanitization-like rule to release the elements of the aggregate at a lower level. In this case, we would require a proof that the sanitization is sufficiently Iossy with respect to the whole rather than the individual elements. Given the aggregation constraint TS-DATE DEST, the containment axiom would disallow the creation of a SECRET access view containing both DATE and DEST. Given the constraint TS-ITEMS, the axiom would disallow a SECRET access view that returned more than 10 items.
The second requirement is that if the set of access views authorized to a given user contains an aggregate, then the user's clearance must be at leaat the aggregation level: Because this view is parameterized, each view application binds to one record instance of the ITEM relation. Thus, we can regard each view application as effectively creating a new access view for the record to which it is bound. If the total number of view applications ever exceeds 10, then there will be more than 10 views on ITEM, and their union will violate the aggregate access axiom. For aggregation purposes, the set of instantiated access views associated with a user may be represented by a simple count.
We do not place additional constraints on the coUective accesses of groups of users. Our belief is that most practical aggregation policies are handled by considering individual accesses.
System Design
The preceding sections have outlined a high-level policy model for a secure database system based on classification and accessviews. The axioms state the security conditions that must hold by the system and each instance of the database. in this section, we give a rough sketch of a tentative system design to support our view concepts. Because some features can get quite complex -e.g., sanitization and aggregation constraints -our approach allows for the incremental development of increasingly complex features through layering.
We decompose the entire system into a set of k layeru. Each layer i builds on lower layers and implements a 8ecurity poliqy Pi, which is a set of triples (U, V, o) specifying that user U can perform operation o on access view V. Each layer has the property that its policy further constrains view access by requiring that additional axioms be satisfied; thus, Pi~Pi_l for i = 2, .... k. Our formal model will parallel the design layers.
The following is a possible decomposition that builds on existing kernel technology. An alternative strategy is to design a relational database kernel that merges layers 1 and 2. The layers are listed from top to bottom, with the boundaries for the trusted computing base (TCB) and reference monitor as shown: Layer 1 is a 8ecurity kernel implementing the Bell and LaPadula model ls. The kernel supports mandatory security (secrecy and integrity) for singleIevel objects (segments, files, etc.), subjects (users, processes, etc.), process and memory management, and other resource managers. With respect to the view model, this layer supports the underlying physical representation of the database, user clearances, login level, and the login level axiom. The kernel will be used extensively to implement the higher layers. We envisage using the GEMSOS security kernelig in our design.
Layer 2, the element manager, manages objects corresponding to elements: Layer 3 provides the relational operators as well as other numeric or symbolic operatora provided by the database system (e.g. for computing statistics). This layer implements the access methods, including index structures (which themselves are represented aa tables of elements in layer 2).
Layer 4, the mandatory view manager, implements views specified with the layer 3 operators. This layer supports all classification constraints, including derivation and sanitization rules, aggregation constraints, and access views. It is responsible for checking that a set of constraints is complete and consistent -e.g. with respect to all database instances -and for assigning levels to the data (through calls on layer 2). Although classtlcation and aggregation constraints are within the TCB, they are outside the reference monitor because they are potentially quite complex and rely to some extent on the correct implementation of the relational operators. Layer 4 will require 'trusted subjects' to handle classification and aggregation constraints and perform sanitization functions. For sanitization, for example, we may restrict the data that can be retrieved and limit the amount by which the data can be marked down. Each successive layer in the TCB (through Layer 5) introduces further wcioms, thereby restricting while enriching the policy of the system. This does not mean, however, that an implementation of the view model through layer i will necessarily give a particular user less privilege than an implementation that stops at layer i-1. Indeed, we would expect it to give the user more privilege. The reason for the apparent contradiction is that by providing greater support, the higher layer can allow data to be classified at its true level and not become over-classified. To see why, consider a database system supported entirely by a system kernel with single-level objects. It will be necessary to effectively classify all data in the database at the maximum level of the data, and require that all users be cleared to that level. One might argue that the kernel could partition the data by attribute or relation, but this would not give the user the image of a single database and the capability to join and update data at different levels simultaneously. Similarly, layer 4, which supports aggregation constraints, allows data to be classified at its true (low) level rather than at the aggregate (high) level because access to the aggregate is controlled. Thus, by constraining the system, the higher layers enhance security while providing increased access. Of course, because usera will be given greater access, the higher layers must be trustworthy also.
conclusions
The concepts described in this paper represent a starting point for a model that reaches into new areas of database security. By introducing rule-based class~lcation through views that constrain the security levels of the data, the model providea a framework for @dressing the issues of inference, aggregation, sanitization, contex~and content-dependent classification, and dynamic classification. There are, however, many difficult problems that must be solved before these concepts can be realized in an actual system.
We are now formalizing the concepts as a complete security model. We expect that in the process of formalization, the model will undergo revisions and enhancements as we find better ways of expressing the basic concepts and uncover implementation problems. Our goal is a model and system design that can be implemented in a 3-5 year period.
